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CENTRAL PLACE THEORY AND CITY SIZE DISTRIBUTION*
Wen-Tai Hsu
This article proposes a theory of city size distribution via a hierarchy approach rather than the
popular random growth process. It does so by formalising central place theory using an equilibrium
entry model and specifying the conditions under which city size distribution follows a power law. The
force driving the city size differences in this model is the heterogeneity in economies of scale across
goods. The city size distribution under a central place hierarchy exhibits a power law if the distri-
bution of scale economies is regularly varying, which is a general class that encompasses many well-
known, commonly used distributions.
The difference between a high-order metropolis like Chicago and a lower-
order town like Peoria or Burlington was not merely Chicago’s much larger
population. Chicago’s high rank meant that its market attracted customers for
many more goods and services from a much wider region ... Just as one can
rank human settlements according to the number of people who live in them,
so can one rank all economic goods according to the number of people and
concentrations of wealth needed to create a market for them. The hierarchy of
urban settlements is also a hierarchy of markets.
(Cronon, 1991, pp. 279–80).
City size distribution is highly skewed and heavy-tailed: there are many more small cities
than there are large cities, and the distribution can be approximated by the power law,
a.k.a., the Pareto distribution, with a tail index of around one. If the tail index is exactly
one, then the distribution is called Zipf’s law (following Zipf, 1949) or the rank-size rule,
because the product of the rank and size of a city is a constant.
Observation of the power law becomes clearest when city ranks are plotted against
city sizes on a log-log scale, i.e. a Zipf plot. Figure 1 presents a Zipf plot using US 2000
census data for all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). The ordinary least square
(OLS) regression of the log of rank on the log of size for all 362 MSAs entails an R2 of
0.9857 and a slope, of which the absolute value is the approximate tail index, of
0.9491. The fact that a straight line fits fairly well leads one to think that the size
distribution of cities may be generated by the power-law distribution defined by the tail
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probability, P(S > s) ¼ a/sf, s  s, for positive constants a and s and tail index f.
Unlike most empirical work on city size distribution, which relies on city definitions
that are based on administrative units, Rozenfeld et al. (2011) adopt an innovative from
the bottom up approach to construct cities, i.e. population clusters, by applying a
computer algorithm on high-resolution data from the UK and US. They find that the
power law holds fairly well for cities as small as 5,000 inhabitants in the UK and 12,000
inhabitants in the US.1
The striking regularity of city size distribution has attracted considerable interest in
providing explanations for it. The popular approach has been to derive the city size
distribution from the steady state of a random growth process. In a random growth
process, large cities arise due to their long histories of favourable productivity shocks;
however, as the probabilities of such events are low, there are not many large cities, i.e.
a skewed distribution. For why this steady-state distribution should be Zipf’s, see Gabaix
(1999); for why it should be log-normal, see Eeckhout (2004).2 See Duranton (2006,
2007) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for full-fledged general equilibrium
models that match the empirical city size distribution reasonably well.3 However, the
locations of cities in the geographic space typically play no role in such models, and the
size differences are usually driven by luck/shocks rather than by different functions of
differently sized cities.
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Fig. 1. Zipf Plot for All 362 MSAs
Source. 2000 US census.
1 An alternative parametrisation for the city size distribution is the log-normal. Using census places data in
the US, Eeckhout (2004) finds that the entire distribution (entire meaning all human settlements) fits the
log-normal well while the power law remains a good approximation to the upper tail.
2 A log-normal distribution of city sizes entails a slight concave Zipf’s plot. Some deviations from the
benchmark model in this article can also generate slightly concave Zipf’s plots. However, this article focuses
on the power law, and hence these details are omitted.
3 For surveys of this literature, see Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) and Gabaix (2009). The body of literature
explaining city size distribution using static models or a non-random growth process is relatively small; see
Eaton and Eckstein (1997); Brakman et al. (1999), and Krugman (1996).
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This article explains city size distribution using a model in which cities of different
sizes serve different functions in the economy. It builds on the insights of central place
theory, which was first developed by German geographers Christaller (1933) and Lo¨sch
(1940). The idea underlying this theory is that goods differ in their degrees of scale
economies. Goods with substantial scale economies, e.g. stock exchanges or symphony
orchestras, will be found in only a few locations, whereas those with small scale eco-
nomies, e.g. petrol stations or convenience stores, will be found in many. Moreover,
large cities tend to have a wide range of goods, whereas small cities provide only those
with a low degree of scale economies. In Christaller’s (1933) scheme, the hierarchy
property4 holds if larger cities provide all of the goods that smaller cities also provide. We
can readily see that this setup implies a skewed city size distribution.
In this article, a city system consists of multiple layers of cities; cities of the same layer
have the same functions, i.e. they host the same set of industries. This model can be
viewed as a multiple-goods extension of that proposed by Lederer and Hurter (1986),
in which firms play a two-stage game: they compete on price in each local market after
making their location choices. The differentiation among cities is driven by the het-
erogeneity of the scale economies among goods, which can be modelled by the het-
erogeneity in the fixed cost of production, demand or transportation cost. For clean
exposition, the analysis is carried out with heterogeneity in the fixed cost only. How-
ever, it will become clear why the case with heterogeneity in demand or transportation
cost is isomorphic to the case of fixed cost (see Section 1.3).
Two important results of this model are that a class of equilibria consistent with the
hierarchy property exists, and there is always only one next-layer city between two
neighbouring larger cities. The latter result, which I call the central place property, implies
that the ratio of the market areas of one layer to the next is two, which is analogous to
the K ¼ 3 market principle put forward by Christaller (1933). (In the extension to the
plane, if there is always only one next-layer city located in the equilateral triangle area
among three neighbouring larger cities, then the ratio of market areas is three.) In this
article, a central place hierarchy is a city system in which both the hierarchy and central
place properties hold.5
This article makes four contributions. First, it provides a new and parsimonious
model as a microfoundation for central place theory. Although this theory has a long
history in economic geography, its modelling has been mechanical. (See Fujita et al.
(1999b), for a critique of the lack of a microfoundation in the central place theory
literature.) A few attempts to formalise central place theory have been made in the
economics literature (Eaton and Lipsey, 1982, Quinzii and Thisse, 1990, Fujita et al.,
1999a, Tabuchi and Thisse, 2011). Fujita et al. (1999a) generate a hierarchical city
system through an evolutionary approach that extends the core-periphery model of
Fujita and Krugman (1995). Given the existence of the first and largest city, they
4 This property is often referred to in the literature as the hierarchy principle.
5 Following Henderson’s (1974) type-of-cities theory, there is an extensive literature on city hierarchy that
addresses how cities specialise in different industries and how industrial fundamentals affect city size. Central
place theory prescribes a plausible pattern of diversity and a specific pattern of specialisation, but it does not
allow sufficient room to explain more flexible patterns of specialisation across cities. In this view, central place
theory and type-of-cities theory are complements rather than substitutes in modelling city hierarchy. See the
conclusion for further discussion of this issue.
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successfully model the hierarchy property. Compared with this article, however, theirs
does not feature the central place property and it has no particular implications for city
size distribution.6
Second, this article demonstrates that the power law for cities arises from regularly
varying distributions of scale economies, a rather general class that includes many
well-known, commonly used distributions. This is shown in two steps. I first specify
the condition under which the central place hierarchy becomes a fractal structure, in
which the smaller parts have shapes that are similar to the larger parts, which leads to
the power law (Proposition 2). Then, I show that regularly varying distributions
of scale economies ensure that this condition holds (Proposition 3). Although
Beckmann (1958) may have been the first to point out the link between central place
theory and the power law, he provides no economic model for his hierarchical
structure, and his hierarchy lacks the dimension of industries, which is crucial in this
article. Also note that the regularly varying distributions (distributions with a regularly
varying left tail) in this article are of a different class from the regular distributions
defined in Gabaix and Landier (2008), and neither class is a subset of the other. It is
worth emphasising, however, that both articles employ the general properties of
extreme value theory to make predictions independent of the details of the
distributions.
Third, the model is consistent with the number-average-size (NAS) rule, a recently
discovered empirical regularity regarding industrial locations that was first documented
by Mori et al. (2008) using Japanese data. The NAS rule states that the relationship
between the number and average size of the cities in which an industry is located is
linear on a log-log scale with a negative slope. To illustrate, suppose that Major League
Baseball is an industry. As there are 26 cities (MSAs) that host at least one team,
the number of concern is 26, and the average size of concern is simply the average
population of these 26 cities. This regularity provides a view of how city sizes and
industrial activities are related, and it is important to note the result in Mori et al.
(2008) that if the hierarchy property holds, then the NAS rule is essentially equivalent
to the power law. I also examine US industrial-location data using the approach of Mori
et al. (2008) and find that the NAS rule holds very well for three- and four-digit
industries as defined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
The details of this empirical evidence are presented in Appendix A.
Fourth, this article derives the power law for firms, the evidence for which is provided
by Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007). Zipf’s law seems to hold better for firm size than
for city size because the slope is very close to one. Note that a central place hierarchy
also leads to a hierarchy of firms, as those firms that are located exclusively in large
cities serve larger market areas (i.e. more consumers) and thus must be larger. This
article provides a different angle from that in the literature on the power law for firms,
6 Eaton and Lipsey (1982) provide a spatial competition model in which there are two goods and multiple
firms for each good. Based on multipurpose shopping, they show how firms producing two different goods
may co-locate. In this sense, they thus model a primitive hierarchy property. Quinzii and Thisse (1990)
provide a rationale for the hierarchy property via a social planner’s problem. However, neither of these
articles obtains the central place property. Tabuchi and Thisse (2011) model both the hierarchy and central
place properties. Although their hierarchical structure is the most similar to that in this article, their model is
very different, and they do not analyse city size distribution.
906 [ S E P T E M B E RT H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L
 2012 The Author(s). The Economic Journal  2012 Royal Economic Society.
which also draws predominantly upon random growth processes (see, for example,
Simon and Bonini, 1958; Luttmer, 2007).
The modelling in this article proceeds in two steps. In the first step, a basic model
is developed to deliver the fundamental hierarchical structure. A closed-form solution
is readily obtained, which provides a tractable framework for investigation of the
conditions for the power laws and the NAS rule. However, the equilibria giving rise to
central place hierarchies constitute only a subset of the continuum of equilibria. In the
second step, an agglomeration force is created by incorporating workers demand, and
the central place hierarchy as an equilibrium becomes locally unique.7 A numerical
exercise shows that this generalisation does not change the power-law feature of the city
size distribution, although the distribution becomes more skewed.
This article models central place hierarchies as equilibrium results. See Hsu
and Holmes (2009) for a social planners problem that generates these hierarchies via
a dynamic programming approach to central place theory. The rest of the article is
organised as follows. Section 1 lays out the basic model and derives central place
hierarchies as equilibrium results. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the
power laws and the NAS rule hold. Section 3 generalises the model by adding
workers demand and analyses its effects on city size distribution. Section 4 concludes
the article.
1. Central Place Theory: The Basic Model
1.1. Model and One-good Equilibrium
The geographic space is the real line, and the location is indexed as x 2 R: There is a
[0,1] continuum of consumption goods and two types of agents: farmers and firms. The
farmers are immobile and are uniformly distributed on the real line with a density of
one. Each farmer demands one unit of each good in [0,1] inelastically.
For any good to be produced at a given location, a fixed cost is required to set up
production. Denote the fixed cost of production for a good as y, and denote the
(cumulative) distribution function of y as F : ½y; y  Rþ ! ½0; 1: Producing one unit
of each good requires constant marginal cost c. The transportation cost is t per unit per
mile travelled. For each good, there is an infinite pool of potential firms. The firms and
farmers play the following two-stage game (Lederer and Hurter, 1986).
(i) Entry and location stage The potential firms simultaneously decide whether to
enter. Upon entering, each entrant chooses a location and pays the fixed cost to
set up at that location. Assume the tie-breaking rule: if a potential firm sees a
zero-profit opportunity, then it enters.
(ii) Price competition stage The firms deliver goods to the farmers. Given its own and
other firms locations, each firm sets a delivered price schedule over the real
line. For each good, each location on the real line is a market in which the firms
7 Note that the central place hierarchy in this article is also locally stable. It is interesting to note the
similarity that although there are also multiple equilibria in the models of Fujita et al. (1999a) and Tabuchi
and Thisse (2011), the hierarchy equilibria in these models are also locally stable. Also see Berliant (2006) for
a discussion of multiplicity in these models.
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engage in Bertrand competition. Each farmer decides the specific firm from
which to buy each good.
Consider the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE) of any particular good y. Con-
sider two neighbouring firms at a distance of L. Denote the firm on the left-hand side as
A and that on the right-hand side as B. The marginal costs of delivering the good to a
consumer who is x distance from A are thus:
MCA ¼ c þ tx;
MCB ¼ c þ tðL  xÞ:
Bertrand competition at each x results in the firm with the lower marginal cost
grabbing the market and charging the price of its opponent’s marginal cost. Without loss
of generality, let A be located at 0. Thus, the equilibrium prices on [0, L] can be written as
pðxÞ ¼ c þ tðL  xÞ x 2 ½0;
L
2,
c þ tx x 2 ½L2 ;L.

The gross profit for firm A from the market area on its right-hand side and that for B
from that on its left-hand side are both tL2/4. Figure 2 illustrates the marginal cost of
both firms and the equilibrium price, as well as the gross profits from the market area
between A and B.
Consider any entrant’s strategy at the first stage. Let this entrant be named C. If C
were to enter into a market area between A and B, then it is straightforward to show that
C ’s profit-maximising location would be exactly in the middle of the two, given A and
B’s locations. Any deviation from the middle will strictly decrease C ’s profit, and C will
enter if and only if this maximal profit is non-negative. Therefore, firms must be an
equal distance apart, and the gross profit of any firm with a market area of L is tL2/2.
Note that there is no room for arbitrage, and firms can thus exercise price discrim-
ination effectively. To see this, refer to Figure 2. For any consumer located at
0
PA PB
MCA = c + txMCB = c + t(L – x)
c
X
$
c+tL
BA
L
2
L
Fig. 2. Second-stage Competition: Prices and Gross Profits
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x 2 [0, L/2], the marginal cost of selling a product purchased at x to the consumers on
their left is the same as MCB ¼ PA, and that of selling it to those on their right must be
larger than the equilibrium price. Thus, it is impossible for this consumer to make a
profit by reselling the product. The foregoing derivation of an SPNE for an arbitrary
good leads to Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Fix the level of fixed cost y and define L(y) as the solution to the zero-profit condition
t [L (y)]2/ 2 ¼ y. Thus, LðyÞ ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2y=tp : There is a continuum of equilibria in which one firm is
located at every point in fx þ nLg1n¼1; where L 2 [L(y), 2L(y)) and x 2 [0, L(y)).
The continuum of equilibria exists because any distance L in the interval [L(y),
2L(y)) is an equilibrium distance; L  L(y) implies that all firms earn a non-negative
profit (no exit), whereas L/2 < L(y) implies that any new entrant between any two
existing firms must earn a negative profit (no entry).
1.2. Hierarchy Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a collection of locations of firms, delivered price schedules, and
farmers consumption choices such that the allocation for each good y is an SPNE.
In this article, I consider a particular type of equilibrium, that is, one in which the
hierarchy property holds.
Definition 1. A hierarchy equilibrium is an equilibrium in which, at any production loca-
tion, the set of goods produced must take the form [y, y] for some level of fixed cost y.
In a hierarchy equilibrium, a decreasing sequence y ¼ y1 > y2 >    > yI  y;
exists for some I 2 N [ f1g; denoting the cut-offs. A hierarchy equilibrium is said to
satisfy the central place property if the market area of the firms producing ðyiþ1; yi  is half
that of the firms producing ðyi ; yi1:
Definition 2. A hierarchy equilibrium that satisfies the central place property is called a
central place hierarchy. Due to the hierarchy property, any production location produces goods in
the range of [y, yi] for some yi, and it is called a layer-i city.
In fact, it turns out that any hierarchy equilibrium is a central place hierarchy, and it
is characterised as follows. Fix an x 2 R and set the grid for ðyiþ1; yi  as fx þ nLig1n¼1,
where L1 ¼ mL½y; m 2 ½1; 2Þ; Li ¼ L1=2i1, and the cut-off yi is given by the zero-
profit condition
yi ¼ tL
2
i
2
8 2  i  I ; ð1Þ
where the number of layers I will be specified later. Without loss of generality, let x ¼ 0.
Then, the location configuration so constructed is precisely that given in Figure 3,
except that only four layers are depicted in the Figure. By construction, both the
hierarchy and central place property are satisfied.
The fact that the foregoing construction is an equilibrium can be seen in the
following recursive view. The good y is in equilibrium because m 2 [1, 2) (Lemma 1).
For all y 2 ðy2; y; firms earn a positive profit, as they share the same market area as
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type-y firms but they have smaller fixed costs. As y2 is determined by the zero-profit
condition, no additional entrants of y 2 ðy2; y will enter between two existing firms,
because any such entrant would have the same market area as a type-y2 firm but with a
larger fixed cost. This proof applies recursively; because type-y2 firms earn zero profits,
all firms with y 2 ðy3; y2 earn positive profits and type-y3 firms earn zero profits etc. As
the gross profits tL2i =2 shrink over the layers toward 0, the number of layers I is
determined by the last yi ¼ tL2i =2 such that yi  y. Thus, from tL2I =2  y and
tL2Iþ1=2 < y; we get
I ¼

2 lnðmÞ þ lnðy=yÞ
2 lnð2Þ þ 1

; ð2Þ
where bxc denotes the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to a real number x.
Note that (2) already implies that I ¼ 1 if y ¼ 0.
To see that the central place hierarchy is the unique type of hierarchy equilibrium,
first note that any candidate for a hierarchy equilibrium must have ni 2 N layer-i cities
that are evenly spaced between the two neighbouring larger cities. This spacing occurs
because, in equilibrium, all firms producing the same good must be evenly spaced
(Lemma 1). The hierarchy equilibrium constructed above is simply a special case where
ni ¼ 1 for all i. Now, suppose that all goods in ðyi ; y are in equilibrium but ni  2 and
type-yi firms earn zero profits. However, this implies that a new entrant with a y slightly
larger than yi entering the middle point between two existing type-y firms can earn a
positive profit, as its market area is larger than any type-yi firms and its fixed cost is only
infinitesimally larger. This contradicts the condition that all goods in ðyi ; y are in
equilibrium. Hence, for any hierarchy equilibrium, ni ¼ 1 for all i. The results thus far
are summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Central place hierarchy). For each L1 ¼ mLðyÞ; m 2 ½1; 2Þ; let
Li ¼ L1=2i1, yi be given by the zero-profit condition (1) and the number of layers I be given by
(2). Fix an x 2 R, and set the grid for ðyiþ1; yi as fx þ nLig1n¼1. Then, for each m 2 [1, 2),
the location configuration so constructed is the unique hierarchy equilibrium and satisfies the
central place property.
_
y
_
y
y2
y3 y3
0 L1
2
L1
tL22
= y22
tL32
= y32
Fig. 3. A Central Place Hierarchy
Notes. The layer-i cities produce goods in [y,yi]. The cut-offs yi are determined by the zero-
profit conditions. The market areas for goods ðyiþ1; yi  are half of that for ðyi ; yi1:
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1.3. Alternative Sources of Heterogeneity
As noted in the Introduction, the heterogeneity in scale economies across goods can
also be modelled in terms of the heterogeneity in demand or transportation cost.
Suppose that each individual consumes y units of good y, and that the fixed cost of
production is the same across goods and normalised to one. We can use the same
notation for the distribution function of y : F(Æ). It is an easy exercise to derive all of the
results in this article step-by-step, except that the order of goods in terms of the size of
the market areas is now reversed. To see this, first note that the gross profit of firms
producing y is ytL2/2. Then, under a central place hierarchy, the zero-profit condition
determining the cut-off yi is
1
yi
¼ tL
2
i
2
: ð3Þ
Alternatively, suppose that both the demand and the fixed cost are normalised to
one and that y represents the transportation cost with the distribution function F(Æ).
Then, the gross profit of firms producing y is yL2/2. Thus, we get the same zero-profit
condition for the cut-off yi given by (3) with t ¼ 1. The rest of the derivation is similar.
1.4. Discussion
As in Fujita et al. (1999b) or similar models, I employ immobile farmers as a primitive
assumption and the uniform distribution for simplicity. Such assumptions are usually
understood as indicating that there are resources throughout the geographic space
that require on-site extraction/utilisation, such as farming, fishing, mining etc. It does
not matter whether the farming/fishing/mining sector accounts for a small or large
proportion of the population (the fraction of farmers is reflected by the demand from
farmers, and this is normalised to one here); as long as there are people throughout
the space who are immobile and do not provide all goods to themselves, dispersed
towns and cities will emerge as central places for these immobile people and smaller
towns.
2. Power Laws and the NAS Rule
2.1. Power Law for Cities
In a central place hierarchy, all firms in the range ðykþ1; yk  produce for a market of size
Lk. Thus, the output of the firms in this range is Y^k  Lk ½F ðykÞ  F ðykþ1Þ. Define the
size of a layer-i city by the total units produced in that city (as a measure of the level of
economic activity):
Yi 
XI
k¼i
Y^k ¼
XI
k¼i
Lk ½F ðykÞ  F ðykþ1Þ:
Figure 4 illustrates the definitions of Yi. The area shaded with lines and the area shaded
with dots represent the total quantity produced in a layer-1 and a layer-2 city
respectively.
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For every layer-1 city, there is one layer-2 city and 2i2 layer-i cities. Thus, the total
number of cities up to layer-i is
Ri ¼ 1 þ 1 þ
Xi
k¼3
2k2 ¼ 2i1:
We are interested in the relationship between size Yi and Ri, which approximates the
ranks of the layer-i cities. Note that because the rank doubles from one layer to the
next, Zipf’s law is approximated if city size Yi shrinks by approximately half from one
layer to the next (the rank-size rule!). Similarly, if city size Yi shrinks by an approx-
imately constant fraction from one layer to the next, then the power law is approx-
imated.
It is worth pointing out that the above account of the ranks of cities involves looking
at a region/city system of length L1 that is a clone of many others in the geographic
space. An alternative view which better reflects the hierarchial relations across cities is
proposed as follows. If one city B is located within the market area of a larger city A,
then it is within A’s economic hinterland. As this relation is recursive in the spatial
structure, it is best to define the economic hinterland of a city as a subset of the
geographic space in which all of the goods that are produced are also consumed within
the same subset. That is, even when a smaller city is not in the market area of A, if it is in
the market area of B and B is in the market area of A, then the smaller city is also in A’s
economic hinterland. Figure 5 shows an example of the economic hinterland of a
layer-1 and a layer-2 city. Note that the layer-1 cities economic hinterlands partially
overlap, whereas the regions/city systems in the first view do not overlap.
Within any layer-1 city’s economic hinterland, the number of cities up to the ith layer
is given by Ri ¼
Pi
k¼1 2
k1 ¼ 2i  1: For sufficiently large is, Ri=Riþ1 	 1=2: For
simplicity, the following analysis is carried out using the first view of non-overlapping
regions but all the results also hold asymptotically in this hinterland view.
1 1
–L1
2
L1 L1
2
0
F(y2)
F(y3)
F(y4)
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Fig. 4. City Size
Notes. The area shaded with lines and the area shaded with dots denote the size of a layer-1
and a layer-2 city respectively. Both shaded areas are composed of rectangles, each of
which represents the total production of the respective range of goods.
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2.1.1. A simple condition for the power law
There is, indeed, a simple but powerful condition that directly links central place
hierarchies and the power law, regardless of the underlying economics behind that
hierarchy. Given a central place hierarchy, the location patterns of cities of different
layers are fixed and different underlying economics matters only in relation to how the
fractions of goods (zi ¼ F ðyiÞ) in the different layers are determined. The following
Proposition specifies the condition for the fractions of goods that renders the central
place hierarchy a fractal structure.
Proposition 2 (Bounds on fraction ratios). Suppose that there are infinitely many layers
in a central place hierarchy. Let zi denote the fraction of goods produced in a layer-i city, and let
Dk ¼ zk  zkþ1: Suppose that there is a d > 0 and a q > 1, such that for all i 2 N;
d
q
 Diþ1
Di
 qd:
Then,
1
2
ðq1  1Þd  Yiþ1
Yi
 d
2
 1
2
ðq 1Þd: ð4Þ
Proof. Observe Yi /
P1
k¼i Dk=2
k: For weights
wk;i 
Diþk
2iþkP1
k¼0
Diþk
2iþk
;
we have
Yiþ1
Yi
 d
2
¼ 1
2
X1
k¼0
wk;i
Diþkþ1
Diþk
 d
 
:
Therefore,
1 1
Economic Hinterland of Layer 1 City
Economic Hinterland of Layer 2 City
Y1
Y2
Y3 Y3 Y3
Y2
F(y2)
F(y3)
Fig. 5. Alternative View of City Hierarchy
Notes. Only three layers of cities are shown here. The economic hinterlands of a layer-1 and
a layer-2 city are indicated. The shaded areas are the city sizes.
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12
ðq1  1Þd  1
2
X1
k¼0
wk;i
Diþkþ1
Diþk
 d
 
 1
2
ðq 1Þd:
Observe that d is approximately the ratio of the increments (Dk). The approximate
slope of the Zipf plot is
lnðRiþ1=RiÞ
lnðYiþ1=YiÞ 	
lnð2Þ
lnðd=2Þ ¼ 
lnð2Þ
lnð2Þ  lnðdÞ :
The closer the bound q on the ratios of the increments between two adjacent layers is
to one, the better the approximation to the power law. In other words, Zipf’s law
requires only that the increments of the fraction of goods of two adjacent layers do not
vary too much (d ¼ 1), whereas the power law relaxes the ratio of increments between
two layers from one.
2.1.2. Regularly varying distributions
The next question, naturally, is how the behaviour of F() translates into a power law for
cities. A few basic concepts of regular variation are needed.8
Definition 3. A measurable, positive function g is said to be regularly varying at zero (at
infinity) if, for any u > 0, and for some a 2 R;
lim
y#0 ð!1Þ
g ðuyÞ
g ðyÞ ¼ u
a:
If a ¼ 0, then g is said to be slowly varying. A function g is regularly varying with index a if and
only if there exists a slowly varying function ‘(y) such that
g ðyÞ ¼ ya‘ðyÞ:
In what follows, g 2 RVa denotes that g is regularly varying at zero with index a.9
Suppose that y ¼ 0, and hence there are infinitely many layers. Recall from Proposition
1 that ykþ1 ¼ yk=4 for all k  2. Observe that the ratio between the increments
between two layers can be written as
dk  Dkþ1Dk ¼
F ðykþ1Þ  F ðykþ2Þ
F ðykÞ  F ðykþ1Þ ¼
1 F ðykþ1=4Þ=F ðykþ1Þ
F ð4ykþ1Þ=F ðykþ1Þ  1 :
According to Definition 3, if F 2 RVa, then in a small enough neighbourhood of 0,
there are infinitely many k values such that
dk 	 1  1=4ð Þ
a
4a  1 ¼
1
4
 a
: ð5Þ
By Proposition 2, the power law is approximated with a tail index close to 1/(1 þ 2a).
A distribution function F on ð0; y can be regularly varying only with a non-negative
index a because an F 2 RVa on ð0; y with a < 0 must be decreasing in a small neigh-
8 See Bingham et al. (1987) for a textbook/encyclopedia treatment of regular variation.
9 We are not concerned with the regularly varying function at infinity because the analysis here focuses on
the source of heterogeneity being the fixed cost. See more discussion at the end of this subsection.
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bourhood of 0, which violates the requirement of a distribution function.10 However, a
distribution function can be defined via a transformation of a non-increasing function
G 2 RVa with a < 0:
F ðyÞ  GðyÞ  GðyÞ
GðyÞ  GðyÞ ; ð6Þ
where the domain of F is ½y; y for some y > 0. For a y that is close enough to zero, such
an F behaves like a regularly varying function with a negative index a. This is because,
for a y close enough to 0, there exists a sufficiently small neighbourhood of y such that,
for all ykþ1 in that neighbourhood:
dk ¼ F ðykþ1Þ  F ðykþ2Þ
F ðykÞ  F ðykþ1Þ ¼
Gðykþ2Þ  Gðykþ1Þ
Gðykþ1Þ  GðykÞ ¼
1  Gðykþ1=4Þ=Gðykþ1Þ
Gð4ykþ1Þ=Gðykþ1Þ  1 	
1  1=4ð Þa
4a  1 ¼
1
4
 a
:
In any case, when the index a associated with the distribution function is positive
(negative), then the slope of the Zipf plot is smaller (greater) than one. The following
proposition summarises the foregoing discussion and provides statements based on the
density functions.11
Proposition 3 (Regularly varying distributions). Let d ¼ (1/4)a and fix any q > 1.
Then, for a sufficiently small y  0, there exists an integer K > 0 such that condition (4) holds
for all layers I  i  K (with the possibility that I ¼ 1), if one of the following conditions is
met:
(a) the distribution function of fixed cost F 2 RVa with a 2 [0, 1);
(b) G 2 RVa with a 2 (1/2, 0) such that F is defined by (6);
(c) the density function of fixed cost f 2 RVa1, for a 2 (1/2, 1).12
In all cases, the approximate slope of the Zipf plot, i.e. the plot of log of rank on log of size, is
1/(1 þ 2a).
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof of the density part.
The class of distributions that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3 is rather
general, as it includes several well-known, commonly used distributions, such as the
Pareto, Weibull, F, Beta (which subsumes the uniform) and Gamma, which subsumes
the chi-square, exponential and Erlang. See Appendix C for more examples.13
10 See Lemma 1 in Bingham and Teugels (1975). Note that most expositions in the literature are on
functions that are regularly varying at the right-tail. All the results used in this article are from the literature,
e.g. Bingham and Teugels (1975), Bingham et al. (1987), hold for functions that are regularly varying at the
left tail. One can check the results by noting that when a function g(y) is regularly varying at infinity with
index a, then h(y)  g(1/y) is regularly varying at zero with index a.
11 Note that F 2 RVa does not imply the density function f 2 RVa1 unless the density in the neighbour-
hood of 0 is monotone. See Bingham et al. (1987), Theorem 1.7.2b. For most parametric distributions, a
regularly varying F() implies a regularly varying density, and vice versa. However, statements regarding density
are still useful, as there are no closed-form expressions for some distribution functions.
12 In (b), it must be the case that y > 0 and hence I < 1.
13 Moreover, the convolution of regularly varying distribution functions is also regularly varying ( Jessen
and Mikosch, 2006), as is the convolution for densities (Bingham et al., 2006). If a sequence of random
variables on (0, 1) is i.i.d. and regularly varying, then all of the polynomials statistics are also regularly varying
( Jessen and Mikosch, 2006).
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In the case in which the heterogeneity of scale economies is modelled by the demand
or transportation cost, it is the right tail of F() that matters, as most cities host
industries with small scale economies (large demand or a large transportation cost).
Hence, the power law arises when F() has a regularly varying right tail.
2.2. The Power Law for Firms and the NAS Rule
2.2.1. The power law for firms
Not only is the central place hierarchy a hierarchy of cities, it is also a hierarchy of firms.
Any firm producing y 2 ðyiþ1; yi has the size Li ¼ L1=2i1  si :Call this size type of firms
class-i. Note that the measure of class-i firms, mi, is 2
i1½F ðyiÞ F ðyiþ1Þ ¼
2i1ðzi  ziþ1Þ ¼ 2i1Di :Consider the accumulative measure of firms of classes up to i as
the rank of class-i firms:
Mi ¼
Xi
k¼1
mk :
Indeed, the conditions required to ensure that a firm size distribution follows the
power law are the same as those for a city size distribution, although the implied slopes
are different.
Proposition 4 (Bounds proposition on firm size distribution). Suppose that there are
infinitely many layers in a central place hierarchy, and there is a d > 0 and q > 1 such that, for
all i 2 N; dq  Diþ1=Di  qd: Then,
2d=qð Þiþ11
2d=qð Þi1 
Miþ1
Mi
 ð2qdÞ
iþ1  1
ð2qdÞi  1 :
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 4 implies that
lim
q!1
Miþ1
Mi
¼ ð2dÞ
iþ1  1
ð2dÞi  1 ;
which means that Miþ1=Mi is approximately 2d, and the slope of the Zipf plot for firms
is [1 þ ln(d)/ln(2)] for large enough is and for a q sufficiently close to one. If the
distribution of fixed cost F 2 RVa, then the slope of the Zipf plot is approximately
(1  2a). When a is close to 0, both the city and firm size distributions are close to
Zipf’s law.
2.2.2. The NAS rule
Recall that the number of cities in layer i is 2i2 for i  2. Also note that the number of
cities producing ðyiþ1; yi  is equal to the number of cities up to layer-i (Ri). Thus, the
average size of cities producing y 2 ðyiþ1; yi  is
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ASi ¼ Y1 þ
Pi
k¼2 2
k2Yk
Ri
: ð7Þ
Now, i is not only an index for the layers of cities, but is also an index for the industry
groups (ðyiþ1; yi ) located exclusively in cities that are no smaller than layer-i cities. The
following proposition presents the implications of the power law on the slopes of the
NAS plots, that is, the plots of the log of average size against the log of numbers. This
result is in line with that in Mori et al. (2008). In the following proposition, the results
on how ln ASi changes with ln Ri for integer i are obtained from analysing how the
derivative of ln ASi with respect to ln Ri changes with i, as if i can potentially be a non-
integer number.
Proposition 5 (The NAS rule). Suppose that y ¼ 0; hence, there exist infinitely many
layers of cities. Suppose that the power law for cities holds such that Yiþ1=Yi ¼ 2ð1þ2aÞ; with
a 2 (1/2,1/2).14 If a 2 [0,1/2), then d lnðASiÞ=d lnðRiÞ is strictly decreasing in i, and
0 >
d lnðASiÞ
d lnðRiÞ > 1; ð8Þ
lim
i!1
d lnðASiÞ
d lnðRiÞ ¼ 1: ð9Þ
If a 2 (1/2, 0), then
lim
i!1
d lnðASiÞ
d lnðRiÞ ¼ ð1 þ 2aÞ: ð10Þ
Proof. See Appendix B.
Using Japanese data, Mori et al. (2008) and Mori and Smith (2011) find that the
NAS plot is quite linear with a slope of around 0.7. As reported in Appendix A, the
NAS plot using US data exhibits similar features with a slope of around 0.75. Note
that the distinction between the two cases in Proposition 5 is whether a < 0. In both
cases, even though they are different in their implications on Zipf’s plot in terms of
whether the corresponding slope is greater than one, the implied NAS slope is <1,
which is consistent with the empirical findings. To see this, observe that if a 2 [0, 1/2),
the local slope (in absolute value) is < 1 and converging to one. Thus, if finite but
numerous layers are observed in the data, then the NAS plot should be quite linear with
a slope of <1. When a 2 (1/2, 0), then the slope converges to 1 þ 2a < 1, which
again implies a quite linear NAS plot with a slope of < 1.
14 Note that a < 1/2 is not a bad restriction for city size distribution, as we rarely observe tail indices of
<1/2 in city size data; see Soo (2005). In this model, a tail index greater than 1/2 implies a < 1/2.
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3. The General Model
In the basic model, given any hierarchy equilibrium, another equilibrium can be
obtained by deviating the locations of the firms producing any particular good by
moving their locations by the same distance and in the same direction. This is because
such deviation changes nothing in terms of pricing and profits. In this Section, a more
general model is presented by incorporating workers demand to create an agglom-
eration force that refines the hierarchy equilibrium. A numerical exercise is carried out
to examine how this incorporation affects the city size distribution.
3.1. Model and Equilibrium
Although the current model seems to be a partial equilibrium one, it actually has the
following general equilibrium interpretation. Assume that farmers are immobile and
that each farmer, using a unit of land and their unit labour endowment, produces a
units of the agricultural good, which is set as the numeraire as well as the unit of utils. All
costs and prices in the previous sections are hence denominated in the agricultural
good. Following the literature and for tractability, the transportation cost of the agri-
cultural good/numeraire is set to zero. Consuming one or more than one unit of any
y 2 ½y; y entails p units of utils, and the utility of a farmer at location x is hence
uðxÞ ¼
Z y
y
maxfp  pðx; yÞ; 0g dF ðyÞ þ a:
Then, simply allow sufficiently large a and p so that each farmer purchases one unit of
each y in the the unit measure of manufactures.
In addition to the farmers and firms in the basic model, there is a third type of agent:
workers, whose labour is the variable input to produce manufactures. A unit of manu-
factures requires / 2 (0, 1) units of labour. The marginal cost of production is then
c(x) ¼ /w(x), where w(x) denotes the wages at location x. Each worker has one unit of
labour endowment and the same preference as the farmers. The difference between
farmers and workers is that the latter have endogenous entry and location decisions
like firms, and they have the backyard technology needed to home-supply themselves
with any manufactures with unit cost r. If a potential worker does not enter, then he or
she enjoys a reservation utility of u.
Again, p is sufficiently large that each worker, like each farmer, consumes one unit of
each y. Denote the equilibrium prices charged to workers as pw(x, y). (The prices that
workers face are not necessarily the same as those that farmers do because of the
existence of workers reservation price r.) A worker at x has a utility of
uðxÞ ¼
Z y
y
ðp  minfpwðx; yÞ; rgÞdF ðyÞ þ wðxÞ: ð11Þ
To describe the market clearing conditions, let j(x, y, x 0) be the indicator function of
the purchase decision of a farmer at x 0 about the type-y good produced by a firm at x,
i(x, y) be the indicator function of whether a firm producing a type-y good sets up at x,
N(x) be the total measure of workers at x, and Y(x) be the total units of all types of
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goods produced at x. The market clearing for each local labour market and the markets
for goods require
N ðxÞ ¼ /Y ðxÞ; ð12Þ
Y ðxÞ ¼
Z 1
0
iðx; yÞ
X
fx 0:jðx;y;x 0Þ¼1g
N ðx 0Þ þ
Z 1
1
jðx; y; x 0Þdx 0
2
4
3
5dF ðyÞ: ð13Þ
Definition 4. An equilibrium is a collection fi(,),N(),pw(,),p(,),w(),j(,,),Y()g
ensuring that for each type y, the allocation constitutes an SPNE and (12) and (13) hold. A
hierarchy equilibrium is defined in the same way as in the basic model.
3.2. Local Uniqueness of the Hierarchy Equilibrium
If the reservation price r is less than the marginal cost c(x) for all x, then all workers will
home-supply themselves with all manufactures. In this case, the equilibrium entry for
workers implies that
wðxÞ ¼ u  p þ r  w:
Hence, cðxÞ ¼ c  /ðu  p þ rÞ: Thus, if r < c, or equivalently, r  /ðu  pÞ=ð1  /Þ,
then all firms derive their profits from farmers only and the model is equivalent to the
basic one. If r ¼ c, then firms can charge r to attract workers to buy their goods. This is
the borderline case that the workers demand increases the production of all firms, but
the firms still do not derive any profits from the workers. Hence, a hierarchy equilib-
rium in the basic model remains a hierarchy equilibrium in the general model, but the
city size distribution changes. In fact, this distribution becomes more skewed, because
large cities sell more to workers and hence become even larger. See the next subsection
for further details.
If r > c, i.e. r > /ðu  pÞ=ð1  /Þ, then firms derive profits from the demand of
workers. Suppose that y > 0, and therefore the number of layers is finite. Let LI denote
the smallest market area among all firms. (In a central place hierarchy, LI is the
distance between any layer-I city and either one of its two neighbouring cities.) If r is
not very large such that
r < c þ tLI ; ð14Þ
then r is less than the after-delivery marginal cost of any good supplied by any non-local
firm. As r is the second lowest marginal cost in any production location, every worker
will buy goods from local firms at a price of r and home-produce the rest. Hence, the
cost of living for any worker is, again, r, and the marginal cost is given again by
c ¼ /w ¼ /ðu þ r  pÞ: When r > c þ tLI, firms also sell to workers in other cities,
and the marginal costs across locations start to vary. Although it is more realistic to have
varying marginal costs, they also render the equilibrium locations intractable. Thus,
from this point on, the focus is on the case of r < c þ tLI. This condition will hold if t or
y is sufficiently large.
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Any worker who resides at location x without any production receives zero wages, and
he or she enjoys a utility smaller than p  c: Hence, to ensure that no worker enters
such a location, we also need the constraint that
u  p  c: ð15Þ
Under r > c, (14) and (15), (13) can be rewritten as
Y ðxÞ ¼
Z 1
0
iðx; yÞ N ðxÞ þ
Z 1
1
jðx; y; x 0Þdx 0
 	
dF ðyÞ;
which entails (18) in the following proposition, which considers a central place
hierarchy. Similarly, the profit of a type-y firm with y 2 ðyiþ1; yi  is
pðx; yÞ ¼ tL
2
i
2
þ ðr  cÞN ðxÞ  y;
which gives rise to the zero-profit condition (17). Further details of the characterisation
of a central place hierarchy are given below.
Proposition 6 (Central place hierarchy). Suppose that the distribution function F is
continuous, r > c, and (14) and (15) hold. Then, there exist central place hierarchies charac-
terised by each layer-i city’s population Ni, total production Yi, cut-off good yi, the largest market
area Li, and the number of layers I, such that the following hold.
(i) L1 satisfies
tL21
2
þ ðr  cÞN1  y  0; tL
2
2
2
þ ðr  cÞN2  y < 0: ð16Þ
(ii) For i  2,
yi ¼ tL
2
i
2
þ ðr  cÞNi ;Li ¼ L1
2i1
: ð17Þ
(iii) For all fi 2 1, 2, . . ., Ig,
Yi ¼ F ðyiÞNi þ
XI
k¼i
½F ðykÞ  F ðykþ1ÞLk ; ð18Þ
Ni ¼ /Yi ; ð19Þ
where I is the largest integer satisfying tL2I =2 þ ðr  cÞNI  y:
Proof. See Appendix B.
Recall that when r  c, an equilibrium can be created from any hierarchy equilib-
rium by sliding all firms locations for any particular good by the same distance and in
the same direction. Call such a deviation a parallel deviation. Therefore, any deviation
from a central place hierarchy that involves parallel deviations for a subset of goods
(possibly with different distances for different goods) remains an equilibrium under
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r  c. Define a D-deviation as a deviation that involves a subset of goods, each of which
has a parallel deviation with the deviating distance less than or equal to D > 0. Define
the D-neighbourhood of a central place hierarchy as the set of location configurations
that involve D-deviations from the hierarchy. See Figure 6 for a depiction of the D-
deviation of a particular good. When r > c, Proposition 7 shows that any central place
hierarchy is a locally unique equilibrium by showing that any central place hierarchy is
the only equilibrium in its D-neighbourhood when the deviating subset and D are both
sufficiently small.
Proposition 7 (Local uniqueness). Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 6 hold.
Consider the D-deviation of a sufficiently small subset of goods from a central place hierarchy. If
D 2 (0,(r  c)/t), then the new location configuration does not constitute an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. Consider first the D-deviation of a
single good y. If D is sufficiently small, then the type-y firms still sell to workers in the
closest city and earn profits from them. For any particular type-y firm, given other type-y
firms locations, unilaterally moving closer to the closest city by a distance of d decreases
its profit from farmers but increases its profit from workers due to the savings in
transportation costs. Such a move with a small enough d must increase the firm’s
overall profit because the increase in the profit from workers is linear in the population
of the closest city, whereas the decrease in the profit from farmers is linear in d. Thus, at
d ¼ 0, the marginal profit in moving closer the closest city is positive and the location
configuration with this D-deviation does not entail a Nash equilibrium in the location
stage for type-y firms. This argument easily generalises to the case of a D-deviation that
involves a sufficiently small subset (possibly with positive measure) of goods, because all
that is needed is to ensure that the new cities, if any, formed by the deviating workers
_
y
_
y
y2
y3 y3
0 L1
2
L1
} }
δΔ
Fig. 6. D-deviation
Notes. For one particular good, the locations of all firms deviate from the central place
hierarchy by a distance of D. Given all other firms locations, one firm contemplates
whether to move closer to the closest city by a distance of d.
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are not too large compared with the existing cities in the central place hierarchy. Also
note that a central place hierarchy is locally stable in the sense that the deviating firms in
any off-equilibrium location configuration in a small enough neighbourhood of
the hierarchy have incentives to move towards, if not directly jumping back to, their
prescribed locations in the hierarchy.
3.3. City Size Distribution
Combining (18) and (19) gives
Ni ¼
/
PI
k¼i Li F ðyiÞ  F ðyiþ1Þ½  r < c;
1
/1  F ðyiÞ
PI
k¼i Li ½F ðyiÞ  F ðyiþ1Þ r  c:
8><
>: ðAÞ
Let us call the term Yi ¼
PI
k¼i Li ½F ðyiÞ  F ðyiþ1Þ the base demand, which is actually
the definition of city size in the basic model. The city population is just a multiple / of
the base demand in the r < c case, and all of the results with regard to the power laws
and the NAS rule from the basic model hold. It is difficult to obtain analytical results
when r > c, as there are no closed-form solutions to cut-offs yi. However, we can obtain
the general effect of adding workers demand by observing the difference between the
r  c and r < c cases in (A).
It follows from / 2 (0,1) that ½/1  F ðyiÞ1 > /: Hence, an increase in the base
demand increases the city population more in the r  c case than in the r < c case, and
the larger the /, the larger the difference between ½/1  F ðyiÞ1 and /. These effects are
stronger for larger cities (small i s), as F(yi) is larger. As lim/#0 /= ½/1  F ðyiÞ1 ¼ 1;
the r < c case can be approximated with a small /. Hence, adding workers demand
(i.e. changing from the r < c case to the r  c case) or increasing the degree to which
workers are needed (i.e. increasing /) actually results in a more skewed city size dis-
tribution. Numerical comparative statics of / are carried out to illustrate this point. The
algorithm used to compute the equilibrium size distributions is drawn from Proposi-
tion 6 and described in Appendix D.
For simplicity, assume that u ¼ p, and thus for any / < 1, r  c ¼ (1  /)r > 0.
The F employed is defined by G(y) ¼ [ln(1 þ by)]a via (6). Figure 7 shows the Zipf
plots for five values of / ¼ f0.01, 0.21, 0.41, 0.61, 0.81g and the corresponding esti-
mates of the tail indices.15 For all / values, there are 10 layers.
Figure 7 verifies that when / increases, larger cities see greater increases in size,
which results in a size distribution with a lower tail index, i.e. greater skewness. Most
importantly, the addition of workers to the model has little effect on the shape of the
Zipf plots, as they are quite linear (the R2 values are all in the range of (0.989, 0.994)).
A plausible explanation for why the power law still holds approximately is as follows.16
Divide (18) by Yi, and we get
1 ¼ F ðyiÞNi
Yi
þ
PI
k¼i Li ½F ðyiÞ  F ðyiþ1Þ
Yi
:
15 The parameters are u ¼ p ¼ 2; y ¼ 1, y ¼ 106, t ¼ 1011, r ¼ 0.3, and a ¼ 0.1
16 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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As F ðyiÞNi=Yi ¼ /F ðyiÞ ! 0 for large is,
PI
k¼i Li ½F ðyiÞ  F ðyiþ1Þ=Yi approaches one for
large is. Most cities are of large is, and hence if the yis do not change drastically, then
Yi, and hence Ni, should exhibit the power law according the analysis in Section 2.
4. Conclusion
This article provides a parsimonious model that formalises central place theory.
The differences in city size are driven by the heterogeneity of scale economies, and the
central place hierarchy automatically establishes the skewness of the city size distribu-
tion. The power law for cities and firms and the NAS rule arise when the distribution of
scale economies is regularly varying. In fact, this is the condition for ensuring that a
central place hierarchy is a fractal structure. The hierarchy approach to the fractal
structure in this article differs from the generic explanations of self-organised criticality
(Bak et al., 1987) and scale-free networks (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999). As these approaches
can explain the power law distributions that are observed for numerous size distribu-
tions in the physical, biological and social sciences, it would be interesting to probe the
hierarchy approach’s potential to explain phenomena other than cities and firms.
The hierarchy property posits that larger cities are more diverse not only because
they have more industries than smaller cities but also because they specialise in
industries with more scale economies. This is arguably a reasonable view, especially
when we look at industries in broader classifications. Mori et al. (2008) and Mori and
Smith (2011) find that the hierarchy property holds well for 3-digit JSIC but dissipates
for 4-digit JSIC (the finest Japanese industrial classification). In Appendix A, in which I
examine the NAS rule using US data, I find that this rule holds well for 3 and 4-digit
NAICS, but dissipates for 5 and 6-digit NAICS. These findings hint that, at the finest
levels, specialisation matters to the extent that heavy industries can be located in small
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towns due to numerous factors outside central place theory. The development of a
comprehensive theory that produces more realistic patterns of diversity and speciali-
sation is a desirable direction for future research.
Interestingly, the basic model presented here can be directly applied to the
economic activities within a metropolitan area, as the population distribution of the
suburbs of such an area can be viewed as more or less uniformly distributed, especially
in US cities that are characterised by a large degree of urban sprawl. Thus, the
employment/retail centres in a metropolitan area are analogues to the cities in a wide
geographic space. Suppose that the commuting cost within a metropolitan area is zero.
Then, the size of an employment/retail centre can simply be defined as the employ-
ment/total quantity sold at that centre. Retail activities provide a particularly vivid
image of central place patterns (Berry, 1967). It would thus be interesting to examine
whether there are corresponding power laws and an NAS rule for the employment/
retail centres within metropolitan areas.
Appendix A. Empirical Evidence on the Number-Average Size Rule: the US
Case
The empirical literature on central place theory within the field of economic geography consists
primarily of case studies. The earliest such research focuses on the spatial patterns of human
settlements, with the most notable example, of course, being Christaller’s (1933) study of the
spatial patterns of cities and towns in southern Germany, which seems to fit the assumption of a
homogeneous farming plain. Berry and Garrison (1958a, b) provide further case studies of the
sizes and functions of central places in Snohomish County, Washington.
Few empirical studies examined the main propositions/assumptions of central place theory
using large-scale data, such as national data, before that carried out by Mori et al. (2008). These
authors document empirical regularities in both the hierarchy property and the NAS rule using
Japanese urban-industrial data. To check the hierarchy property, they define the diversity of a city
by the number of industries present within it. Using the three-digit Japanese classification of
industries ( JSIC), they find that in 71% of the industry-city pairs a given industry is present in all
cities with diversity greater than that of the given city. Moreover, they show that this finding is
extremely unlikely to be a random event.
Recall that the NAS rule states that the number and average size of the cities in which an
industry is located follow a log-linear relationship. In Mori et al. (2008), the regressions of the log
of the average size on the log of the number for the 3-digit JSICs of 1980/1981 and 1999/2000
entail R2s that are both over 0.99, with the slopes being 0.7204/0.7124.
Using County Business Pattern Data, I find that the NAS rule also holds for the US. Figure A1
shows the NAS plot (log of average size on the vertical axis and log of the number on the
horizontal axis) for the 77 three-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
(1997 version). Similar to Mori et al. (2008), I exclude the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and
Hunting (11) and Mining (21) sectors, as they are not considered to have central place func-
tions. Public Administration (92) is also excluded, because its locations are not determined
solely by economic incentives and thus could be arbitrary. The presence of an industry in a city
is defined as any positive employment in a MSA or combined metropolitan statistical area
(CMSA).
The OLS regression gives
logðaverage sizeÞ ¼ 17:789
ð0:0141Þ
 0:7477
ð0:0026Þ
logðnumberÞ; R2 ¼ 0:9991;
where the numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
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A straight line fits almost perfectly!17
It is natural to wonder how the NAS plot and the regression result would change if the NAICS
digit or the threshold of presence were changed.18 Figure A2 shows four variations: 3-digit
NAICS and presence defined by the employment of at least 50 people (left-top), 3-digit NAICS
and a threshold of employment of at least 100 people (right-top), 4-digit NAICS and any positive
employment (left-bottom) and 4-digit NAICS and a threshold of at least 50 people (right-bot-
tom).19 The (R2, slope) pairs are (0.997, 0.737), (0.994, 0.721), (0.988, 0.694) and (0.944,
0.622) respectively. Overall, the log-linear relationship is robust across these variations in the
definitions of industry and presence.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. For the density part of (a), recall that f 2 RVa1 if and only if f(y) ¼
ya1‘(y) for some slowly varying ‘(y). Observe that
F ðhyÞ  F ðyÞ
‘ðyÞ ¼
Z hy
y
‘ðxÞ
‘ðyÞ
dx
x1a
¼ ya
Z h
1
‘ðyuÞ
‘ðyÞ
du
u1a
:
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Fig. A1. Number-average-size Plot for Three-digit NAICS
Source. 2000 County Business Pattern Data, US Census Bureau.
17 Although the plot shown in Figure A1 consists of 77 three-digit NAICS, 51 of them are located in all of
the MSAs; thus, they have the same number (267) and average size (813,544). In light of the limited number
of informative sample points in 3-digit NAICS, it is important to note the robustness of the NAS rule in 4-digit
NAICS (shown in Figure A2).
18 The definition of the presence of an industry in a city is a natural challenge to the validity of the NAS
rule. To address this issue further, Mori and Smith (2011) have developed a more stringent definition based
on the identification of industry clusters. That is, if an industry cluster coincides with the location of a city,
then that industry is present in the city.
19 To determine which MSA/CMSA is excluded by the threshold, I use CBP business employment data by
industry and by county. For establishments with more than 1,000 employees, I use cell counts by size class,
industry and county taken from Holmes and Stevens (2004). As these authors show, the employment size
classes in the CBP can be deemed to constitute a fine grid, and the true mean (using national data) in each
size class should be a close enough approximation.
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Applying the Uniform Convergence Theorem for slowly varying functions,20
lim
y#0
F ðhyÞ  F ðyÞ
ya‘ðyÞ ¼ limy#0
Z h
1
‘ðyuÞ
‘ðyÞ
du
u1a
¼
Z h
1
du
u1a
¼ h
a  1
a
:
Note that this limit is equal to ln(h) when a ¼ 0. For any positive h,
lim
y#0
F ðyÞ  F ðhyÞ
F ðy=hÞ  F ðyÞ ¼ limy#0
 ½F ðhyÞ  F ðyÞ
ya‘ðyÞ
½F ðy=hÞ  F ðyÞ
ya‘ðyÞ
¼ ha:
Setting h ¼ 1/4, it can be seen that (4) holds for d ¼ (1/4)a for infinitely many k values such that
yk is in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of 0.
For the density part of (b), the proof is the same as that for case (a) and [F(y)  F(hy)]/
[F(y/h)  F(y)] has the same limit in ha. The only difference is that there are now only finite ykþ1
values in a right neighbourhood of y that are close to this limit.
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Fig. A2. NAS Plots for Different Industry Definitions and Thresholds of Employment
Source. 2000 County Business Pattern Data, Census Bureau.
20 Bingham et al. (1987), Theorem 1.2.1.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Observe that
Miþ1
Mi
¼
Piþ1
k¼1 2
kDkPi
k¼1 2kDk
¼ 1þ 2
iþ1Pi
k¼1 2k
Qi
s¼k Ds=Dsþ1

  :
Hence,
1 þ 2
iþ1
q
d
 iþ1Pi
k¼1 2d=qð Þk
 Miþ1
Mi
 1 þ 2
iþ1
1=qdð Þiþ1Pik¼1ð2qdÞk :
() 2d=qð Þ
iþ11
2d=qð Þi1 
Miþ1
Mi
 ð2qdÞ
iþ1  1
ð2qdÞi  1 :
Proof of Proposition 5. First, consider a ¼ 0, i.e. the exact Zipf’s law case. Then, (7) can be
rewritten as
lnðASiÞ ¼ ln Y1
2
 
þ lnði þ 1Þ  lnðRiÞ:
Let v ¼ ln(ASi), and s ¼ ln(Ri) ¼ (i  1) ln (2). Thus, the foregoing equation can be rewritten
as v ¼ ln(Y1/2)  s þ ln[s/ln(2) þ 2], and
d lnðASiÞ
d lnðRiÞ ¼
dv
ds
¼ 1þ 1
s þ 2 lnð2Þ ; ðB.1Þ
which implies that (8) and (9) are true, as s > 0, and s ! 1 as i ! 1. For a > 0, let b ¼ 22a.
Then, (7) can be rewritten as
lnðASiÞ ¼ lnðY1Þ þ ln 1þ b
2i  b
2ð1 bÞ
 	
 lnðRiÞ:
It is easily verified that
d lnðASiÞ
d lnðRiÞ ¼
dv
ds
¼ 1þ b
1½s= lnð2Þ
3b 2 b1½s= lnð2Þ
lnðbÞ
lnð2Þ ; ðB.2Þ
which immediately implies that (9) is true. This d lnðASiÞ=d lnðRiÞ > 1 follows from the fact
that b > 1 and s  0. To show that d lnðASiÞ=d lnðRiÞ < 0; we need to show that the second term
on the right-hand side in (B.2) is <1, which would be true if
b1½s=lnð2Þ
3b 2  b1½s=lnð2Þ <
1
2a
:
Observe that
b1½s=lnð2Þ
3b 2  b1½s=lnð2Þ 
b
2ðb 1Þ ¼
22a1
22a  1 <
1
2a
:
The last inequality follows from the fact that a 2 (0, 1/2). That d lnðASiÞ=d lnðRiÞ is strictly
decreasing in i follows directly from (B.1) and (B.2).
Now, consider a 2 (1/2, 0). Observe that
lim
s!1
b1½s= lnð2Þ
3b 2 b1½s= lnð2Þ ¼ 1:
Hence, (B.2) gives (10).
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Proof of Proposition 6. Using Points 1, 2 and 4, the argument for each good being in an SPNE is
the same as Proposition 1 in the r  c case. The additional profits from sales to workers do not
alter the fact that firms would prefer to be located in the middle of their neighbours. The rest of
the proof shows that there is a solution that satisfies Points 1 to 4. Observing (17)–(19),
fYi;Ni; LigIi¼1 are obviously decreasing sequences. Combining (17)–(19),
yi ¼ tL
2
i
2
þ /ðr  cÞ
1  /F ðyiÞ
XI
k¼i
½F ðykÞ  F ðykþ1ÞLk : ðB.3Þ
Looking at (B.3) recursively back from the layer-I cities,
yI ¼ tL
2
I
2
þ /ðr  cÞ
1  /F ðyI Þ F ðyI ÞLI : ðB.4Þ
Given L1 and I, note that F(0) ¼ 0 and F(1) ¼ 1 and define
CI ðy; L1Þ ¼ tL
2
I
2
þ /ðr  cÞ
1 /F ðyÞ F ðyÞLI  y:
Hence, CI(0) > 0 and CI(1) < 0. Because F() is left continuous, a solution to CI(y) ¼ 0 exists.
Denote this solution as y
I : Obtain such a solution for each I, and find the I that ensures that
y
Iþ1 < y  y
I : Then, redefine y
Iþ1 ¼ y:
Define similar mappings of Ci(y) recursively using (B.3), given y
iþ1; y


iþ2; . . . ; y


I : Solving Ci(y) ¼
0 given y
iþ1; y


iþ2; . . . ; y


I entails a correspondence of vectors dependent on L1, yðL1Þ ¼ fy
i ðL1ÞgIi¼1
with y
i ðL1Þ > y
iþ1ðL1Þ for all i values. y(L1) is strictly increasing in L1. Equation (16) can be
rewritten as
y
1ðL1Þ  y  0; y
2ðL1Þ  y < 0: ðB.5Þ
Indeed, because F() is continuous, WðL1Þ  y
1ðL1Þ  y has a closed graph, W(0) < 0, and
W(1) > 0. Thus, there exists an L
1 such that WðL
1Þ ¼ 0  0, and 0 can be arbitrarily small.
That is, there exists an L
1 such that Point 1 (or, equivalently, (B.5)) holds.
Proof of Proposition 7. I first prove the Proposition for the D-deviation of an arbitrary good y,
and then show how it generalises to a sufficiently small subset of goods.
Consider a D-deviation of an arbitrary good y with D small enough such that c þ tD < r. For
any type-y firm, the two closest cities must be a layer-I city and a layer-i one for some i < I. The
condition (14) and the fact that c þ tD < r imply that D < LI. Hence, the distances of any type-
y firm from the two closest cities must be D and LI  D. Any type-y firm must sell to the city that
is D distance from it. It may also sell to the city that is LI  D distance from it, if LI is
sufficiently small.
Consider y 2 ðykþ1; yk  with k < I. Then, every type-y firm’s closest non-layer-I city must be a
layer-i city with i  k, and the distance between each type-y firm and the layer-i city is D. Given
the locations of other firms, consider the profit that a type-y firm can earn by unilaterally moving
d 2 [0,(r  c)/t) closer to its nearest layer-i city (see Figure 6). Denote this profit by p^k;iðdÞ: In
the case of a type-y firm selling to two cities,
p^k;iðdÞ ¼ t
2
L2k  d2
 þ fr  ½c þ tðD dÞgNi þ fr  ½c þ tðLI  Dþ dÞgNI  y: ðB.6Þ
The first-order derivative is
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dp^k;iðdÞ
dd
¼ t½ðNi  NI Þ  d: ðB.7Þ
Thus, given other firms locations, dp^k;ið0Þ=dd ¼ tðNi  NI Þ > 0 implies that the optimal d must
be positive and the type-y good is obviously not in equilibrium. In the case of a type-y firm selling
only to one city, we simply remove the third term on the right-hand side of (B.6) and have
dp^k;ið0Þ=dd ¼ tNi > 0:
For y 2 [y, yI], any type-y firm sells only to its nearest city, unless D ¼ LI/2. This is because,
when D 6¼ LI/2, no two type-y firms that are closest to any given city are of equal distance to that
city and hence the workers in that city only buy y from the firm that is closer. Employing similar
arguments, when D 6¼ LI/2, each type-y firm has an incentive to move toward its nearest city,
given other firms locations. For the case of D ¼ LI/2, assume that the sales to the workers in any
city are evenly split between the two nearest firms. Then, given other firms locations, each type-y
firm has an incentive to move towards the larger of the two nearest cities, because it can thus grab
the entire market of y in that city.
The above result trivially generalises to a D-deviation of a measure-zero subset. Now, when a
D-deviation involves a positive measure of goods, a deviating type-y firm may sell to some deviating
workers, in addition to the farmers and those city workers who stay put. Some of these deviating
workers may form small cities if the deviating firms line up at the same locations, some of them may
spread out continuously on a line segment and some may be sporadically located at unconnected
different points. The sales to the third group can be ignored and the sales to the second group of
workers are similar to those to farmers. Without loss of generality, suppose the deviation involving y
is to the right. For an arbitrary deviating type-y firm, denote ~N ‘ ð ~N r Þ as the total mass of the above-
mentioned first group of workers (possibly from different locations) to the left (right) of it that it
sells to. To see why the deviating subset needs to be sufficiently small, take the case of a type-y firm
selling to two cities and y 2 ðykþ1; yk  with k < I. In this case, (B.7) evaluated at 0 becomes
dp^k;ið0Þ
dd
¼ tðNi  NI þ eN ‘  eN r Þ:
The second group of workers does not factor in this formula because their role is similar to
farmers and is nullified by taking d to 0. As Ni  NI þ eN ‘ > 0, as long as ~N r is small enough,
dp^k;iðdÞ=dd > 0 and thus the type-y good is not in equilibrium. Of course, the total mass of
deviating workers eN ‘ þ eN r is limited by the size of the subset involved in the deviation. This
argument trivially applies to all the other cases.
Appendix C. Examples of Regularly Varying Distribution Functions
Table C1 lists distributions that are regularly varying at the left tail. If the domain of a distribution
listed is unbounded from above, then it is understood that some proper truncation of the right-
tail is needed (due to the existence of the upper bound of fixed cost y). For clarity, the functions
shown are proportional to the distribution and density functions, hence ignoring the adjustment
of the parameters due to normalisation and/or truncation.
Appendix D. Algorithm Used to Compute the Equilibrium Size Distributions in
Section 3
Recall that the number of layers must be limited to ensure that they are finite in this case. First,
make a grid of L1, running from the top down. Given that each L1 and LI ¼ L1=2I1; I can solve
yI by (B.4) for each I 2 N: The larger the I, the smaller the yI. The yI ðL1Þ and I(L1) are those that
satisfy yI  y and yIþ1 < y. After I(L1) and yI ðL1Þ are pinned down, solve yi recursively using (B.3)
and backwardly from yI1 to y1. Thus, a sequence fyiðL1ÞgIi¼1 is obtained. Find the L1 such that
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y1ðL1Þ  y and y2ðL1Þ < y: Redefine y1 ¼ y: Finally, given L1 and yi, fYi ;Ni ;LigIi¼1 are calculated
according to Proposition 6.
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